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mThe
RICIS
Concept
The University of Houston-Clear Lake established the Research Institute for
Computing and Information systems in 1986 to encourage NASA Johnson Space
Center and local industry to actively support research in the computing and
information sciences. As part of this endeavor, UH-Clear Lake proposed a
partnership with JSC to jointly define and manage an integrated program of research
in advanced data processing technology needed for JSC's main missions, including
administrative, engineering and science responsibilities. JSC agreed and entered into
a three-year cooperative agreement with UH-Clear Lake beginning in May, 1986, to
jointly plan and execute such research through RICIS. Additionally, under
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16, computing and educational facilities are shared
by the two institutions to conduct the research.
The miss/on of RICIS is to conduct, coordinate and disseminate research on
computing and information systems among researchers, sponsors and users from
UI-I-Clear Lake, NASA/JSC, and other research organizations. Within UH-Clear
Lake, the mission is being implemented through interdisciplinary involvement of
faculty and students from each of the four schools: Business, Education, Human
Sciences and Humanities, and Natural and Applied Sciences.
Other research organizations are involved via the "gateway" concept. UH-Clear
Lake establishes relationships with other universities and research organizations,
having common research interests, to provide additional sources of expertise to
conduct needed research.
A major role of RICIS is to find the best match of sponsors, researchers and
research objectives to advance knowledge in the computing and information
sciences. Working jointly with NASA/JSC, RICIS advises on research needs,
recommends principals for conducting the research, provides technical and
administrative support to coordinate the research, and integrates technical results
into the cooperative goals of UH-Clear Lake and NASA/JSC.
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Relevant Quotations From the Authors of This Report and Related
Memos:
la
.
.
.
.
"Although CAIS is believed to be necessary and
extensible, it is certainly not sufficient for the SSE.
However, it represents very good work by good,
experienced people. The underlying conceptual model is
sound. Any attempt to define an adequate SIS for the
SSE must cause the designers to come to grips,
eventually, with the same issues faced by the CAIS
designers. It would be far too expensive, time
consuming, and risky to ignore this body of work by
'reinventing this wheel'."
"Building-in and sustaining safety in large, complex,
non-stop, distributed systems is not simple. Nor can
this be guaranteed. Success requires depth-of-
knowledge of a number of interrelated subjects..."
"For target subsystems which life and property depend
upon, any att@_pt to Diq_v-back .... on inappropriate
models and paradigms of _n obsolete o_eratinq system is
_q_/_i_!!! (e.g., UNIX V.X., BSD4.X etc.)"
"The one apparent certainty determined by the SERC team
and others is that the unit of software distribution
supported by the PCEE must be below the program level
and at least to the task level. Otherwise, the risk of
being unable to sustain the SSP life cycle requirements
for both mission and safety support is unacceptably
amplified."
"Working Definition
Safety: The probability that a system, including all
hardware and software and human-machine
subsystems, will provide appropriate
protection against the effects of faults
which, if not prevented or handled properly,
could result in endangering lives, health,
property or the environment. (CWM, July,
1987)"
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=o "The terms 'secure UNIX' and 'safe UNIX' are temporal
oxymorons unless:
i) all features of UNIX are hidden beneath the
virtual interface set of a strongly typed
language such as Ada and
2) application programmers are denied access to
assemblers and other untyped languages."
V
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wExecutive Summary
The focus of this report is on Systems Interface Sets (SIS)
for large, complex, non-stop, distributed systems, such as the
Space Station Program (SSP), which incrementally evolve over a
long period of time and have an indefinite life cycle. This
research team is convinced that the traditional division of
issues into host environment versus target environment is
inadequate to scale-up to meet the needs of the SSP. Instead,
the subdivision must be expanded to encompass the issues
integrated across three distinct sets of environmental activities
and responsibilities:
Host (Where software for the target environment is
developed and sustained.)
Target (Where the executable versions of the software
developed in the host environments are to be deployed
and operated.)
Integration (Where the configuration of the current
target environment baseline is controlled. This
environment is responsible for the test and integration
plans used to interactively advance the target
environment baseline with approved changes in software
emanating from the host environments. This environment
is also responsible for controlling interactions with
the target environment to maximize safety during
emergencies.)
All three environments have requirements for User Interface
Sets (UIS) and System Interface Sets (SIS) where the UIS refers
to the human-system interfaces and the SIS refers to the
interfaces of the application software and command language to
the underlying system software and hardware resources. Although
the requirements for the UIS and SIS have some key differences
among the three environments, an integrated perspective reveals a
strong core of commonality which can and should be exploited to
enhance the life cycle management of SSP:
complexity
safety and quality for both systems and software
cost effectiveness for both systems and software
technology transfer into other applications to enhance
productivity, sustain safety, improve quality, and
improve cost effectiveness.
The SIS of the SSP was selected as the focus of this study
because an appropriate virtual interface specification of the SIS
is believed to have the most potential to free the project from
four life cycle tyrannies which are rooted in a dependance on
either a proprietary or particular instance of:
vi
Operating Systems
Data Management Systems .
Communications Systems
Instruction Set Archi-
tectures
The SIS allows tools, rules, application software, test
software, command language scripts, etc. to be developed/acquired
on a foundation of the virtual interface specifications rather
than on the physical interface specifications of the underlying
operating system, etc. Please note that this research team is
convinced that the avoidance of these four tyrannies is an
absolute requirement if the life cycle goals of the Space Station
Program are to be accomplished under the currently anticipated
constraints of: adequate availability of appropriately qualified
personnel, support of intended missions, budgets, and schedules.
Functional requirements are the primary drivers in
constructing host environments. That is, resources are
configured and controlled to maximize the productivity of
computer systems and software engineers, programmers, and
management in the phases and activities of developing and
sustaining software for the target environment. Nonfunctional
requirements (i.e., constraints on the implementations of the
functional requirements) are far less of a driver in the
establishment of requirements for the host environment's UIS and
SIS. For example, the host SIS typically exists in an earth-
based environment without stringent requirements on tightly
constrained real time operations; fault tolerance; limitations of
electrical power; volume limitations; etc. By contrast, the SIS
of the target environment must be strongly influenced by the
nonfunctional requirements imposing constraints upon: real time
deadlines, fault tolerance, power and volume availability, etc.
The SIS of the integration environment is driven by a balance of
functional and nonfunctional requirements which allow it to
interact with the target environment for performance monitoring;
reconfiguration; on-orbit integration to advance the target
environment baseline; symbolic debugging and critical control
support of safety during emergencies.
Although the UIS is not the principal focus of this study, a
few observations may be useful. For example, the UIS of the host
environment should emphasize functional requirements to enhance
programmer productivity. This implies an emphasis on: syntax-
directed, template-driven editors; window management; graphic
design aides; and other enhancements for professionals who
develop and sustain software. By contrast, the UIS of the target
environment should be optimized not for software professionals
but for users and mission specialists who desire a natural
interface to their application domain. Similarly, the UIS of the
integration environment provides needed support for command
language querying and interaction with system components of the
target environment under normal and emergency conditions.
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To understand the issues of both the unique requirements and
the commonality requirements of the SIS among the three
environments, two macroscopic perspectives are useful. The first
perspective is the "static" viewpoint which encompasses all host
environment phases and activities from systems requirements
analysis up to and including the preparation of the executable
versions of the software which are to be deployed and operated.
Tool builders/acquirers typically have this perspective. The SIS
of the CAIS is strongly influenced by this perspective.
The second macroscopic perspective is the "dynamic"
viewpoint of what happens during the execution of programs. This
is where the subset of the SIS requirements described in CAIS
should be augmented both by complementary extensions needed for
the SSP and, of even more importance, by the dynamic requirements
of a Portable Common Execution Environment (PCEE) capable of
maximizing the ability to sustain safety while fulfilling mission
requirements in a distributed system with non-stop components.
For example, are there enough resources in the execution
environment to handle peak workloads and safety critical
emergency conditions? Can safety be sustained and meet mission
requirements when certain classes of faults are encountered,
etc.?
Please note that whereas static viewpoints pertain primarily
to the tools and rules of the host environments, dynamic
viewpoints must cross all three environments. That is, whereas
the SIS-based tools and rules for developing and sustaining
software are often uniquely located in the distributed host
environments instead of target environments, execution issues
cannot be unique to the target environment for at least two major
reasons. First, verification issues including: testing, quality
assessment, simulation, and emulation (all of which require
execution in the host environment) must take place to an
appropriate degree before code can be trusted to be transitioned
through the integration environment into the target environment
for deployment and operation. Second, new tools and rules are
likely to be needed throughout the life cycle of the host
environment. These tools must be developed and executed in the
host environments to be effective. Thus, although tool builders
and tool configuration managers are likely to emphasize a static
viewpoint in describing the UIS and SIS of systems such as the
SSP; mission administrators, specialists, operators, users,
safety engineers, and quality managers are likely to emphasize
the viewpoint of the dynamic aspects of the three environments.
This report recommends the adoption of CAIS as an extensible
baseline for the SIS of the host and integration environments of
the SSP. However, the reader should note that the SIS
requirements of CAIS strongly reflect the predominantly static
viewpoint of tool builders and tool administrators. As such,
they are only an extensible subset of the overall SIS
viii
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requirements needed for SSP. This report further recommends that
a definition and appropriate test bed support be established as
soon as possible for a Portable Common Execution Environment
(PCEE) that reflects the execution environment requirements of
activities which are unique to the needs of a particular
environment as well as those which are integrated across the
three environments (i.e,, the PCEE must be both tailorable and
extensible.) In particular, recent SERC research which has
produced the "Clear Lake Model for Life Cycle Support of Computer
Systems and Software Safety in the Target and Integration
Environment of the Space Station Program" has identified
requirements for a "safety kernel" execution environment composed
of a minimum of 12 highly interdependent models of key components
underlying a PCEE such as: management of distributed, nested
transactions; management of unique identifications for objects,
transactions, and streams; dynamic, multilevel security;
redundancy management; etc. The requirements for the high degree
of interactions and interdependencies among these 12 component
models which underlie the SIS of an execution environment are not
incompatible with the less stringent requirements that emerge
from the more static viewpoint of tool builders and tool
administrators proposed in the SIS of CAIS. However, since these
additional requirements are clearly issues-at-risk on the
critical path of major SSP phases and components and since none
of the test bed activities now underway are specifically focused
on these issues, appropriate action is needed soon.
Chapter 1 of this report provides: background and overview
information with a set of working definitions and explanations of
key terms and concepts used throughout the report. Chapter 2
focuses primarily on the static perspective of CAIS and PCTE
activities. Chapter 3 focuses primarily upon the dynamic
perspective of a PCEE. Chapter 4 provides a summary and
recommendations. Appendices and a bibliography are attached to
further clarify issues addressed in the report.
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1.0 Background
This report is based upon the lessons learned from:
Reviewing and interacting with the development of the
current CAIS (MIL-STD 1838)
Interactions with other designers proposing distributed
versions of the CAIS
Interactions with the design team now evolving CAIS-A
Interactions with the design team of the Portable
Common Tool Environment (PCTE)
Interactions and participation in the evolution of the
Ada RunTime Environment Working Group (ARTEWG) Catalog
of Interface Features and Options (CIFO)
Development of the Clear Lake Model for Distributing
Entities of Ada Programs
Development of the "Clear Lake Model for Life Cycle
Support for 'Computer Systems and Software Safety' in
the Target and Integration Environments of the Space
Station Program".
i.I Intended Audience
This report should be of use to at least the following groups:
• All NASA offices concerned with computer automated
systems. In particular, NASA SSP offices from Level A
and Level A' down to the offices administrating SSP
test beds.
• SSE contractors, management, and users
• TMIS contractors, management, and users
• DDT&E contractors, management, and users
• PSC contractors, management, and users
• SSP international partners, contractors, managers and
users.
1.2 Overview of Key Terms and Concepts in a Hierarchical
Development Order
1.2.1 Services and Resources:
Service: Work done or duty performed for another or
others (Webster's Unabridged, 1987)
Resource: Something that lies ready for use or can be
drawn upon for aid.
A supply of something to take care of a need,
e.g., coal (Webster's Unabridged, 1987)
1
1.2.2
Discussion: As used in this report, the word "service"
conveys a sense of "active" work performed
whereas "resource" conveys a sense of
being "passively" available for use.
Object:
Any logical or physical entity with an abstract
specification which answers the following questions:
• what services and resources are provided or
consumed by the object
• how well are they provided
• under what circumstances are they provided
(See Figure 1-1)
Discussion: This abstract specification can be
considered to provide a "virtual
interface" to the object• From the
perspective of users, the abstract
specification also provides the "one way
in/one way out" for the object• Since
objects are intended to communicate by
messages, the virtual interface can be
used as an inventory of the message
requirements. Abstract specifications are
always to be separately compilable from
the implementation part of the object if
an implementation part exists.
The implementation part, if it exists,
hides all design decisions regarding the
object• Trade-offs between: hardware and
software, algorithms and data structures,
and traditional versus AI design
techniques are encapsulated inside this
object implementation. Other information
which may also be hidden inside the
implementation part may include knowledge
that this is a complex object which is
composed of several other objects• For
example, a component written in assembly
language can be encapsulated inside an
object body. Since users of the object
can only see the abstract specification,
access to the code segments and data
structures of the assembly language
routine would be hidden from the users and
controlled inside the implementation part.
2
abstract
specification
implementation
v
Communicate
with messages
via abstract
specifications
abstract
specification
implementation
object 1 object 2
E
FIGURE i-I TWO COMMUNICATING OBJECTS
3
1.2.3 Entity Attribute/Relationship Attribute Models:
Represent domains of interest in ter_s of:
• the entities within each domain
• relevant attributes of these entities
• the relationships among the entities
• relevant attributes of these relationships
Discussion: Although the Entity Attribute/
Relationship Attribute (EA/RA) model was
introduced by Dr. Peter Chen in 1976 as a
data base modeling approach which captured
additional semantic information (meta-
data) beyond the techniques of
hierarchical, CODASYL and relational data
bases, the EA/RA approach was quickly
recognized for its power and parsimony.
Its use has now spread into almost the
entire spectrum of computing.
When objects are mapped to entity
representations, the approach is
particularly powerful. Since each object
embodies the software engineering
principles of abstraction, modularity,
information hiding, and localization, an
EA/RA model can be used to passively
represent a design structure depicting the
relevant objects, their relationships, and
the key attributes that represent the
design. Analysis for completeness,
consistency, etc. is greatly facilitated.
Also of great importance is the ability to
leverage the rich semantic information
captured by the model to understand the
potential effects of proposed changes to
the baseline design. The model is also
bringing discipline and order to what had
previously been a collection of ad hoc
approaches and guidelines (typically
insufficient) for developing and
sustaining on-line schemas, subschemas,
and dictionaries.
Two more recent developments which hold
great promise for future computing systems
include:
• the use of on-line instances of
EA/RAmodels to actively enforce
strong typing, integrity controls,
and multiple views for access and
context control•
wthe draft ISO (International
Standards organization) standard
for IRDS (Information Resource
Dictionary System). This standard
permits on-line instances of EA/RA
models to be used among
heterogeneous computing systems of
different vendors.
1.2.4 Stable Interface Sets:
Used to represent and sustain baseline control of an
interface set. They must satisfy three requirements:
I. From the perspective of a complete inventory,
an SIS is a virtual interface set resulting
from the union of all abstract specifications
of the objects designed to be visible at this
interface. (That is, the total collection of
all the services and resources to be provided
at the SIS, how well and under what
circumstances.)
2. From the perspective of any given object
within an SiS regarding its relationship to
other objects in the SIS, there should exist
a formal model in EA/RA form describing:
• the "need-to-know" and "right-to-know"
visibility among all objects of the SIS
and
. the grouping of objects into discreet
sets of services and classes of services
within each of the sets.
3. From the perspective of external objects
outside the SIS, a formal model in EA/RA form
is used to describe:
. exactly what sets and classes of
services are to be visible to the object
• the protocols (necessary steps) and
access control to be imposed upon the
external object and its use of the
services and resources provided at the
SIS.
(See Figure 1-2.)
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m1.2.5 Layering:
Refers to a hierarchical structuring approach featuring
enforced access to the services and resources of each
layer throuqh the laver!s _Dterface _pecifications.
Thus an entity in layer "N" which is authorized to
access a service of layer "N - i" can only access the
service by complying with the protocol requirements
associated with the interface specification of the
service. For baseline control, systems should be
constructed in a hierarchy of layers where each layer
is sustained as a Stable Interface Set. (See Figure i-
3.)
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1.2.6
Discussion: Layers should not be confused with the
structuring approach known as "Levels"
(e.g., as used in UNIX). Levels also
group services and resources into
associated sets of functionality that are
described by interface specifications.
However, no automatic enforcement of
access via the interfaces is typically
available. Furthermore the protocols
generally allow a service in level N to be
accessed from anywhere (as opposed to
restricting access to a few authorized
entities in the adjacent layer). Because
the interface specifications for levels
are usually provided in an untyped
language, any enforcement of structural
integrity must rely strongly on off-line
guidelines, practices, and shop standards.
Used properly, layering contributes to
firewalling of faults that occur within a
layer. Upper layers are often able to
compensate for faults which occurred in
lower layers. The successive layers of
thrust explicitly reflect both the
functional architecture of the system and
the differing degrees of criticality
associated with the functionality of the
layer. Security, integrity, and
reliability are three critical concerns
that can now be addressed appropriately
within each layer.
Stable Frameworks:
The three requirements for Stable Frameworks (SF) are:
i. Within any layer a collection of closely related
objects that should be regarded and maintained as
a unit shall be identifiable by unique attributes•
2. The collection of objects within a layer which are
to be identified as a unit via the unique
attributes can be treated as "strongly typed".
That is, a complete determination can be made of
legal values and legal operations for SF's of this
type.
Within any layer, a formal model in EA/RA form can
be used to represent the relationships of the
strongly typed SF's to other strongly typed SF's
both within and external to the layer.
(See Figure 1-4.)
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=1.2.7 Conceptual Models:
At a level of abstraction appropriate to facilitate
understanding and communication among the intended
audience, the conceptual model is an invaluable aid to
explain the level-of-detail relevant to a level of
decomposition of the major constituents of the solution
or problem space under review. The current level's
constituent entities, attributes, relationships to
other constituent entities in the decomposition, and
the attributes of these relationships are made visible.
The transformations that have mapped this level from
the previous level of decomposition are traceable. A
foundation is also laid which will render the
transformation to the subsequent level traceable.
(Figures 1-5 and 1-6 could be augmented with
appropriate documentation to serve as examples.)
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1.2.8 Environments: Host, Target, and Integration
Host Environment
• Software Life Cycle Only: Software for the
Target Environment is developed and
sustained in this environment.
Deliverables for the Target Environment
are provided to the Integration
Environment which is responsible for
installation, integration, and operation.
System Life Cycle: Software, hardware, and
human-system interfaces are developed and
sustained in this environment.
Deliverables for the Target Environment
are provided to the Integration
Environment which is responsible for
installation, integration, and operation.
Note that the Software Support Environment
(SSE) of the SSP has system life cycle
responsibilities in spite of its use of
"software" instead of "systems" in the
title.
Target Environment
• Software Life Cycle Only: Software developed
in the Host Environment and commands
emanating from the Integration Environment
are deployed and operated here.
System Life Cycle: (A similar distinction
should be made as in the discussion of the
Host Environment.)
Integration Environment
• Software Life Cycle Only:
• Accepts software from the Host Environment
and performs any final verification,
validation, and quality assessment
activities prior to installation and
deployment in the Target Environment•
Responsible for administration of test and
integration plans to interactively advance
the Target Environment baseline.
Controls and monitors operations in
simultaneous support of both mission
requirements and safety requirements.
. Controls and monitors the current software
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baseline in the Target Environment during
both normal and emergency operations.
System Life Cycle: (A similar distinction
should be made as in the discussion of the
Host Environment.)
Discussion: The authors are convinced that, for large,
complex, non-stop, distributed systems
such as the SSP,
• the traditional division of issues into
host and target is insufficient. The
division into the three sets of
environments described above is critical
for the life cycle.
• Both the Host (i.e., SSE) and
Integration Environments must support
the systems resources of the Target
Environment rather than Just the
software issues• Specifically, the
traceabillty and management of all
software, hardware, and human-system
interfaces throughout the life cycle
must depend upon an integrated approach
to the on-line representation and
control of these baselines in the target
environment.
Environment Perspectives: Static and Dynamic
Static: Encompasses all Host Environment phases and
activities from systems requirements analysis
up to and including the preparation of the
executable versions of the software which are
to be deployed and operated in the Target
Environment.
Dynamic: Encompasses all that happens during the
execution of commands and executable versions
of programs.
Discussion: Tool builders and acqulrers typically
emphasize a static perspective of the
functional requirements of the Host
Environment. By contrast, the
simultaneous support in the Target
Environment of both mission requirements
and safety requirements is impossible to
develop and sustain without a dynamic
perspective that considers the balance of
functional and nonfunctional requirements.
17
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In this report, the authors recommend a
Portable Common Execution Environment
(PCEE) be defined as a complement to the
more statically influenced standards for
System Interface Sets such as CAIS
(Common APSE (Ada Programming Support
Environment) Interface Set) and PCTE
(Portable Common Tool Environment). (See
Figure 1-5 and the following discussion in
Section 1.2.10.)
Host Environment Stable Interface Sets:
ARTEWG CIFO, PCTE, PCEE
CAIS, CAIS-A,
CAIS: (MIL-STD 1838) Common APSE Interface Set.
Provides a standard for the Systems
Interface Set of host environments that is
intended to promote transportability and
interoperability. A primary focus is to
facilitate this promotion by providing
appropriate support at the SIS for tool
builders.
CAIS-A: Now being defined as an intended successor
to CAIS. Specifically, it is intended to
address many of the deferred subjects in
CAIS such as distribution.
ARTEWG CIFO: Ada RunTime Environment Working
Group Catalog of Interface Features and
Options. The ARTEWG is recognized and
partially supported by the Ada Joint
Program Office with a charter to address
Ada runtime environment issues. Subgroup
3 (currently chaired by one of the
authors) is responsible for evolving CIFO.
PCTE: Portable Common Tool Environment. This
work was sponsored by the Commission of
European Communities. Although the work
has many goals in common with the CAIS
work, there are many notable differences
in both goals and results. (Several of
them are described in Chapters 2 and 3 of
this report.)
PCEE Portable Common Execution Environment.
This is a SERC Team proposal to define a
standard for the SSP reflecting the
execution environment requirements which
are unique to each of the three
18
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Discussion:
environments (host, target, and
integration) as well as those that are
integrated across the three.
The standard should be in the form of Ada
specifications in a Catalog of Interface
Features and Options similar to the slowly
evolving ARTEWG CIFO. The System
Interface Set of the PCEE would be
complementary to CAIS and CIFO but would
have a distinct emphasis on dynamic issues
to maximize the simultaneous support of
both mission and safety requirements in
the Target Environment of SSP. An
essential component of the PCEE not now
addressed in either CAIS or ARTEWG CIFO
would be the command language requirements
to support the Target and Integration
Environment interactions as described in
this report.
Bare Machine Philosophy:
As used by the SERC Team, this concept is based upon
two principal tenets:
Application software should be developed by
professionals who focus on Ada
imp i ementations of solution models where
independent appl ication problems in the
environment require independent solution
models and therefore independent application
programs. The application software
professionals depend upon the underlying
systems software for the runtime management
of all services and resources which are
intended to be sharable among independent
application programs, either initially or in
the future. In turn, the application
programs are responsible for the management
of any services and resources which are
specifically intended to be non-sharable with
other programs.
Systems software should be based upon Ada
implementations which:
• manage sharable services and resources
provided to authorized application
programs and command language instructions
. manage the simultaneous support of both
19
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mission and safety requirements
particularly in the Target and Integration
Environments. Note that if the mission(s)
involve multiple, independent application
problems, then the systems software should
support multiple, independent application
programs (i.e., multi-programming) where
each may have its own balance of
functional versus nonfunctional
requirements. However, the systems
software must simultaneously sustain a
level of mission and safety requirements
at each site that can never allow a lower
priority or less stringent application
program to compromise the mission and
safety requirements either assigned to the
site by configuration control or that is
associated with more demanding application
programs with execution requirements
dependent upon that site.
The two integrated tenets of this concept led to the
term "bare machine philosophy" because both the
application software and the systems software are built
entirely in Ada (to the maximum extent possible) .
Furthermore, the same compiler is used for both. As
shown in Figure i-6, the individual application program
components that are to be assigned to a site can be
compiled and an inventory of their calls for runtime
environment services and resources can be made. (Note
that these calls come from the compilation of both
application source code components and their explicitly
imported application library modules. ) Then,
transparent to the application developers, this
inventory of required runtime support is augmented by
consulting the configuration object base to determine
what additional services and resources may be required
at this site. If, for example, "B3 class, multilevel
security" and "no single point of systems software
failure can cause..." are system level configuration
requirements from this site, then this information is
used in conjunction with the above inventory to select
the runtime support library components that are to be
compiled to support the application program components
assigned to this site. (Note that such system level
configuration requirements can and should be
transparent to the application software developers.)
Concluding Discussion: The component models and
paradigms of the Ada language, such as multitasking and
exception handling within independent application
programs, do not map easily or well to the older-if-
2O
wnot-obsolete component models and paradigms of most
current state-of-the-practice operating systems. This
is particulary true for parallel and distributed target
environments. Therefore many compiler producers with
perceived requirements to execute on top of a
conventional operating system have had to devote
incredible talent, energy, and other resources to
produce Ada runtime support that is a compensatory
mechanism for the inadequacies of the underlying OS.
(Attempting to graft silk to a sow's ear comes to
mind.) This practice is not only inefficient resulting
in larger code segments and much slower execution than
necessary, it is also a much greater risk in the long
term for reliability, security, and the much more
demanding aspects of safety• (More will be discussed
about this in Section 1.2.12.) These and other
attributes of the executable code and command language
components can never be any better than the combination
of the:
• compiler,
• runtime library, and
• execution environment
can support• The authors of this report, the SERC
team, and many other researchers of computer systems
and software engineering with Ada believe strongly in
the Bare Machine Philosophy as the best chance for
simultaneously supporting both mission and safety
requirements in large, complex, non-stop, distributed
environments which evolve incrementally over a long
development period and must be continuously sustained
over an even longer life cycle.
1.2.12 Safety: A Clear Lake Model for Integrating Twelve
Underlying Component Models to Support Computer Systems
and Software Safety
Safety: "The probability that a system, including all
hardware, software, and human-machine subsystems, will
provide appropriate protection against the effects of
faults which, if not prevented or handled properly,
could result in endangering lives, health, the
environment, or property." (CWM July '87)
Discussion: The simultaneous support of safety and
fulfillment of mission requirements is an
"end", not a "means". For the Space
Station Program, such component models as:
dynamic, multilevel security; tailorable
runtime support environments developed in
Ada; resource pools; distributed, nested
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transactions; command language interface;
redundancy management; and six others are
regarded by the authors as "means" of
improving the probability of success of
achieving these goals in the target and
integration environments of the SSP.
These twelve component models are highly
interdependent and interactive in their
support of mission and safety requirements
for a Portable Common Execution
Environment (PCEE) as recommended in this
report. Readers desiring additional
information should consult Appendix B of
this report plus the relevant SERC Memo
listed in the Bibliography.
v
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2.0 Commonality Perspective of CAIS and PCTE
Both CAIS and PCTE are intended to support the execution of
software engineering tools in a host environment. Their goal is
to promote the portability of tools from one software engineering
facility to another and thereby reduce the redundant effort
currently required to develop programming support tool sets. The
source of this redundant effort and the specific goal of both
CAIS and PCTE is the significant variation in the organization
and structure of required system services with which tools must
interact. These variations are so extreme that the effort to
move a tool from one system to another is a significant barrier.
There are enough aspects which require complete revision of the
software that often only a low percentage of the code can be used
as originally designed.
Thus both PCTE and CAIS aim to define what is typically
considered the operating system interface. This interface must
be provided in one form or another on each system which is to
support the common tools, but the effort to provide this
interface is less significant than the redevelopment of the
tools. Even if this were not the case, there are significant
advantages to the commonality of the interface and tools in terms
of the familiarity to the users, and ease of movement among
software developers from one development facility to another.
In the process of defining these System Interface Sets, it
was recognized that to do so requires an implicit model for
information management and conventions on the organization of
system resources, e.g.:
the organization and naming of files and devices,
how to store and reference file and device characteristics,
and
whether and how to support explicit identification of
relationships between files, etc.
In fact, it was uniformly decided that this issue demanded a new
perspective beyond what has been traditionally provided. Both
PCTE and CAIS adopted an information management approach referred
to as Entity Attribute/Relationship Attribute or EA/RA modeling.
Developed originally for data base management, EA/RA is a
generalized approach to information management which was chosen
for its potential in providing management control over complex
and evolving systems. It can be used not only to organize and
provide control over files, but over other resources, such as
devices, network facilities, users and user groups. As discussed
in Chapter I, it can also be used to support stable interfaces,
layers, and stable frameworks.
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It is quite significant that a common approach is being
adopted and made a central part of the services provided.
Equally significant, although beyond the scope of this
discussion, is the approach to and support for the evolution of
information management conventions. This holds promise for
allowing technology development without outdating existing
systems.
In addition to addressing information management, it was
necessary to define some significant aspects of program execution
in the host environment. Although PCTE and CAIS differ, it is
equally a part of their specification to address this issue. It
is in this area that PCTE and CAIS fall short of providing a
Portable Common Execution Environment that meets the needs of the
Space Station Information System. It is their limited focus on
tool support and the necessity to remain open to a wide range of
commercial systems that dictated their approaches. The
consequence is limited application of their process management
approaches to the widely distributed, highly reliable
applications present in the space station.
2.1 Desired Characteristics of a Common Systems Services
Interface Set
Both CAIS and PCTE consider a number of desired
characteristics, from a number of different perspectives, in the
design of their tools interface sets. One such perspective is
the tool writer, i.e., what does the tool writer need, beyond the
Ada language, to write portable tools. A different but equally
important perspective is that of the project information manager,
i.e., what management controls should be provided, for users
through the tools, for use by tools, and built into common tool
services. The last perspective is that of the system
administrator, taking a systems-level perspective of collections
of software development facilities and of collections of
resources within a development facility. In this case the
concerns are those of interaction between systems, the exchange
of data, and of coordination of resources, as well as how to
allow for distribution and manage such distribution. These
different perspectives will be considered in turn, prior to the
discussion of the contents of the two interface sets.
r
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2.1.1 The Tool Writer's Perspective:
The writer of a tool is the first source of requirements,
and perhaps the easiest to satisfy. The requirements are in the
form of services and resources necessary for the tool writer to
accomplish the task at hand and provide the user with a
"friendly" interface. These services are by now quite familiar.
UNIX is an excellent example of focusing on these requirements
and providing a flexible and powerful set of services. (Only the
introduction of high-resolution, bit-mapped screens, pointing
devices for input, and the surrounding windows-oriented
user-interface demand new attention). For the following
discussion the required services are partitioned into two areas
of concern: process control and external interactions.
Process control is a concern for two reasons. First, the
tool writer needs to know about the execution context of a
program, what are the predefined attributes and how these might
be changed. Both PCTE and CAIS equate unit process execution,
with associated scheduling and resource control, with Ada program
execution. Thus, the model for process control provides the
framework for answering the context of program execution.
Of further interest, however, is how to start up other
processes and to coordinate their execution; how to communicate
with other processes if necessary; and how to synchronize with
the execution of another process. These services are needed
principally to support multi-user systems and to support
background activities and contexts for single users. They are
used more by the command language processor or multi-user
executive than the individual tools, but still must be a part of
the common system services.
Neither PCTE nor CAIS are looking at process control
facilities to provide parallel execution on multi-processor
configurations for the purpose of improving the performance of
tools. In this and other respects their process control
facilities are very traditional and limited in their ability to
support complex systems of cooperating processes.
The second area of concern is that of external interactions.
A tool needs to know about its coordination with the user, in
terms of inputs, messages, options in tool execution, user
break-in possibilities, logs, and listings. A similar concern is
its coordination with the data base (files) of design
information, source, and object code. A common interface set
must provide a common set of services and resources to support
these interactions.
Altogether, the tools writer's needs are generally met by
any standard operating system. The requirements are not new and
can be easily met in a basic form. The nature of their basic
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definition and interaction, however, depends on the other
requirements of a system interface set covered in the following
sections.
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2.1.2 Information Management Concerns:
Most significant in altering the common conception of system
interface sets is a recent focus on providing more powerful
information management facilities. The typical concerns here are
those of configuration control, ensuring data base integrity,
information security, and access control. As a preface to this
discussion, it is important to note that the whole concept of
information management has taken on new meaning with the
introduction of the Entity Attribute/Relationship Attribute
(EA/RA) model. Now information management is frequently
conceived of and understood in terms of entities, relationships
and attributes. Thus while these concerns have been recognized
as significant in the past, there is now a common mechanism to
support their definition and raise the common perception of the
need for their support. The draft ISO standard IRDS (Information
Resource Dictionary System) provides a standard way of describing
EA/RA models through schemas, subschemas, and dictionaries that
can be shared among heterogeneous computing systems.
Configuration control of systems is the management of strict
naming of components, baselining of stable versions, and control
of updates. The requirements on a system interface set are to
support these management activities and to provide the means to
enforce management conventions. The EA/RA model offers a way to
explicitly identify and trace relationshlps between components
and to identify the distinguishing characteristics of components
and their relationships. These have been recognized as
significant, if not invaluable to configuration control. In
comparison with existing file systems, in an EA/RA data base more
semantic information about the files (i.e., their relationships
and attributes) is explicitly available. In addition, the type
and extent of information stored would be tailorable on a
per-project basis.
Integrity control is the assurance o_ da stable and
coordinated data base despite procedural (human n software) and
hardware failures. With project data bases growing in size and
complexity, this is becoming a significant issue. It is
considered a significant weakness of UNIX. The techniques used
consist of ensuring sufficient information has been saved and
marked before an operation has started to enable returning to
that information should the operation fail. For a common
interface set the requirement is for a very localized version of
this, commonly identified as transaction services. Various
levels of complexity can be supported up to the level of
distributed, hierarchically-nested transactions. PCTE provides
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this full extent, while CAIS-A appears to be aiming at only basic
transaction services.
Information security and access control are further
requirements on defining a common interface set. There are two
perspectives which may be imposed depending on the application of
the tool set. The most common is to provide for group and
individual ownership and access rights to files, thus providing
partitions within a common data base. The principle purpose of
such partitions is to protect against accidental destruction and
casual search and to provide ownership responsibility of files
which must be maintained, archived, and limited due to storage
and other restrictions. The second perspective consists of
formal security, logical if not physical isolation of
information, and protection from active attempts at unauthorized
access. This latter perspective is only now being considered
feasible within a typical multi-user computer system.
2.1.3 System Administrator's Perspective:
The final source of design requirements is the system
administrator. There are two major concerns which the system
administrator recognizes: interaction between systems and
distribution of resources within each system. In each case there
is a wide range of issues which have been raised, with a
corresponding range of complexity in addressing them in the
definition of the system interface set. Unlike the tool writer's
perspective, which is well understood, and even the manager's
perspective, which is more recent and less understood but with a
certain current consensus, the system administrator's perspective
is not fully appreciated and the related issues are without full
consensus.
The principle issues in providing for interaction between
systems are of exchanging files and exchanging project data bases
between systems which may not be compatible in terms of their
host computer, operating system or other factors. A related
concern is for supporting backup and archival of data and
ensuring that a future system upgrade or replacement will not
invalidate the data which has been archived. A typical
resolution involves at least a common external form for data
storage and for representing the relationships and attributes
within a project data base.
The CAIS-A project team has clarified that support in this
area is a middle ground between the application level and media
levels. CAIS-A will not attempt to define application standards
for representing application data systems, nor will it require
that an unknowing program be able to open any given file and
interpret its contents. At the other extreme, CAIS-A will not
define media standards for storage devices. The support left in
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the middle is the definition of a common external form, which all
CAIS implementations will recognize, for the "meta-data-
(relationships and attributes of the data base) and for the basic
representation of data within a file.
To explain this situation further, the issues here are
closely related to the issues of interoperability between tools
whether they are co-located, concurrently executing, or even
different generations of the same tool. Interoperability refers
to the ability to exchange information, where information is not
only the data involved, but also the proper interpretation of
that data. The difficulty is that information is interpreted at
many levels in its lifetime. Useful exchange of information
requires standards of representation at all levels. Consider the
following:
Within the program, the design dictates how the information
which is to be worked upon will be reflected as a collection
of certain data declarations. These alternatives in
representation are at the highest level and are dependent on
the application domain. As an example, the definition of an
intermediate representation for an Ada program is an
important design characteristic of Ada compilers which
differs substantially in current implementations.
In its representation as data objects in the program, the
information is interpreted by the compiler into a particular
representation in the target hardware which is to execute
the program.
Beyond this, for information exchange, it must be written
out using the standard Ada I/O services. One noted issue in
interoperability is that current standards for external
representations do not provide any information about the
data structures which have been written out
(non-self-descriptive file formats). The information cannot
be retrieved without implicit knowledge of these data
structures and the application which created them.
Even without consideration for a self-descriptive file
format, at this point, the compiler, operating system and
physical media all define individual aspects of
representation. These individualistic aspects generally
prevent any other combination of compiler, operating system,
and device from accessing the information, even when given
the original program.
It is recognized that true exchange of information requires
a staggering amount of standardization, and that a common system
interface set cannot solve all of the problems. The system
interface set should, however, define the middle ground between
the application standards and implementation details, such that
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tools developed at different sites and at different times will
agree on the writing and reading of the basic data structures in
the Ada language.
The other aspect of the system administrator's concerns is
that of managing a distributed set of resources within one
system. At one extreme, this concern has simply been dismissed
as being entirely an implementation concern. That is, there is
no need to consider these problems because distribution can be
provided fully transparent to the tool writer; there is no
impact on the definition of the interface, only its
implementation. The alternative is to recognize the possibility
of distributed resources and provide some support to the
implementation of the interface set.
From this latter perspective, the most important feature is
the incorporation of standard attributes and relationships which
can be used to provide an information management model of the
resource distribution. This can be used to allow tracking of
resources (e.g., what data is where, what processes are where,
etc.), network administration and fault recovery. Similarly,
attributes and relationships can support distributed data
management with replication as needed and coordinated updates.
m
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2.2 CAIS and PCTE: The Definitions of System Interface Sets
The following sections will discuss in greater detail the
contents of CAIS and PCTE. For our purposes, a system interface
set will be considered to consist of three parts. We first look
at the foundation, the model for information management. In both
cases this is EA/RA. The bulk of a system interface set
definition will be actual services provided, which are discussed
next. The services are organized in terms of EA/RA management,
process control, and external interaction services. The next
section considers the conventions and predefined aspects which
all implementations must provide. The final consideration is of
general design issues in defining a common interface set in Ada.
These last considerations are primarily drawn from the effort to
develop an Ada specification for PCTE.
2.2.1 The Model for Information Management:
This is the area of the most technical innovation for system
services, and one for which PCTE and CAIS have chosen the same
approach. The basic system supports the establishment of a
logical network of "entities" connected by "relationships". The
most fundamental application of the model for information
management is as a replacement for the traditional file system.
This serves as a good example for comparing differences and
similarities with an existing model.
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Traditionally, file systems have been organized as a simple
"flat" partitioning of the available file storage space, or as a
more flexible hierarchical system. In the case of a hierarchical
system, files are grouped into directories, similar to the
partitions in a flat system, but which may also contain
sub-directories. Sub-directories contain other files as well as
other sub-directories and so on in a hierarchical fashion. Note
that because of the hierarchical organization, access to a file
is no longer a matter of specifying the one partition which
contains the file. In this case, a "root-directory" (or
top-level directory) as well as the nested set of sub-directories
must be specified. This is known as a file's pathname.
In an EA/RA data base, a file is one type of entity.
Relationships are used to group and connect them. A directory
would be a different type of entity used solely to connect
several related files. In this system, a file can have several
relationships to other files and have several relationships
connecting to it. The system is no longer a simple hierarchy,
but a highly interconnected nest of files and relationships (see
Figure 2-1). Each such nest would have a unique starting point,
corresponding to the root directory. For the EA/RA data base,
the root would have specific attributes associated with a
particular user or group using the file-system.
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While it may appear to lead to enormous complexity, properly
managed, the file system will reflect the logical relationships
which exist among the files, and these relationships will have
been made explicit and visible. The system does not change the
requirements for accessing a file. As for the hierarchical
system, a "root" starting point, and pathname for traversing the
various relationships are all that is required. If appropriate
or necessary, a hierarchical system can be directly represented
as a subset of the more general EA/RA capabilities.
Both PCTE and CAIS-A will provide an enhanced capability in
which the various entities and relationships are strictly
classified (also called strongly typed, but this differs somewhat
from the strong typing of programming languages). For these
systems, the different entity types will be distinct, ensuring
that only proper operations are performed. Thedifferent types of
entities which may be managed by the system are open to user
extension. For example, sets of objects and their relationships
along with their respective attributes can be assigned a common
attribute suffix to form a Stable Framework (SF) as discussed in
Chapter i. Now the SF can be addressed as a strongly typed
object and, in turn, can exchange messages with other SF's just
as if they were single instances of a strongly typed object.
Both CAIS-A and PCTE will allow for system evolution as new
entity types and relations are derived from existing ones and
designed to co-exist.
CAIS and PCTE diverge in their application of the EA/RA
modeling. PCTE provides these services as a replacement for the
typical UNIX file system, with entity typing used as a way to
distinguish between different types of files in the system. CAIS
takes the modeling further, applying it to process management and
access control, and in the case of CAIS-A, to peripherals and
distributed resources within a system.
2.2.2 The Set of Services and Resources:
with the EA/RA model as a basis for information management,
a number of common operations, which would be duplicated for each
type of entity in previous systems, can be consolidated under the
heading of EA/RA management. These services provide for the
creation and deletion of entities (called nodes in CAIS and
objects in PCTE), as well as connecting the entities into the
system through relationships. For each entity type and
relationship type there are a number of required and optional
attributes which may be speclfied at the time of entity creation
and connection respectively. While PCTE and CAIS-A go about
their EA/RA management in different ways, and PCTE has a more
limited domain of entity types, the basic capabilities are
similar between the two.
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A second group of services are provided in the area of
process control. Here the standard services of process creation
and termination, including abort, suspend and resume are
provided. Each system has mechanisms for returning results and
for waiting for a process to complete and return results. CAIS-A
has noted the need for separating process creation from actual
startup. Interprocess communication is provided for through
message queues. PCTE provides messageless non-waiting signals.
These services are not significantly different from each other,
each providing a basic multi-process capability. This
multi-processing capability is traditional, however, and as was
indicated earlier, is not appropriate for complex multi-processor
and multi-programming applications. In particular, to represent
an Ada program with one process control block, regardless of how
many separate threads-of-control have been spawned within the
program, is regarded by this research team as a very damaging
deficiency of both CAIS and PCTE. (The reader should remember
that Ada provides dynamic support for firewalling properly
designed tasks. Therefore, the failure of one task need not
cause the program to abort or other tasks to be corrupted.
Designed properly, the failed task can be replaced or a safe
work-around can be effected in a non-stop execution environment.
However by not representing each thread-of-control within the
program with its own process control block in an accountable,
hierarchical relationship to the main program's process control
block, such issues as: interactive symbolic debugging,
reconfiguration, performance monitoring, and interactive safety
support provided by the integration environment to the target
environment become far too difficult to deal with safely.)
The final area of system services is broadly classified as
external interactions. External in this case refers to being
external to .the program (tool) which is executing, we have
already discussed interaction with another process. The other
two aspects are data base (file system) interactions and user
interaction.
Much of data base interaction is now subsumed by EA/RA
management, but there are additional requirements to read and
write the contents of the files. These are handled with
traditional file I/O services. The differences between CAIS and
PCTE are directly tied to their origins. CAIS is intended to
serve principally the Ada language, and so its I/O capabilities
are exactly those defined in the Ada language reference manual
(LRM). PCTE, on the other hand, is explicitly derived from UNIX,
and thus borrows the UNIX I/O services. The Ada specification
for PCTE which is being developed will replace the UNIX services
with Ada's, with slight modifications where necessary for
compatibility. In any case, there is little surprising about
these capabilities.
PCTE has taken, and CAIS-A intends to take, a significant
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wstep beyond traditional system support in providing transaction
services. Such services are necessary to ensure integrity of the
data base with multiple and distributed processing. PCTE
provides the full capability of distributed nested transactions,
while CAIS-A currently is looking at only single-level
transactions. The reader should note that distributed nested
transactions is the most powerful and parsimonious mechanism
known today for supporting software fault tolerance in parallel
and distributed systems. Single-level transactions, by contrast,
do not allow the full exploitation of parallelism and
distribution in the system and do not support fault tolerant,
non-stop operation.
User interaction is an area of considerable disparity
between CAIS and PCTE, and also between CAIS and recommendations
for CAIS-A. CAIS as it currently stands defines an extensive set
of services for traditional devices, those which are similar to
teletypes and line printers (called scrolling devices), those
which allow direct cursor positioning as on a CRT screen (named
page devices) and those which can be partitioned into fields,
some for display text only and some for data entry (named form
devices).
PCTE draws upon its focused charter to address networks of
high-resolution, high-capability workstations. It establishes an
elaborate model of screen and input device servers (processes)
with which an active tool (separate process) may interact.
Services are provided to establish interactive windows on the
screen, and provide window management, mouse control and keyboard
input support similar to that found on the Macintosh and other
systems.
CAIS-A is looking to provide similarly expansive user
interface services, with an eye towards what will be expected of
future software engineering workstations and any suitable
existing standards. Graphics standards which would support the
drawing of software engineering diagrams and standards for
windows, mouse and keyboard input are being considered.
2.2.3 Conventions for Processes, Files, Relationships and
Attributes
In this organization for defining system interface sets we
have covered the model for information management and the nature
of services which are provided. Still needed for a useful system
are standards for predefined node types, relationships and
attributes upon which all tools can depend across all
implementations from one system to the next.
The most common use for standards definitions is in the area
of configuration control of the file system. For entities which
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are files (of type File or derived from type File) required
attributes and relationships might be creation date and time,
tool which called for creation and input file which the tool used
to derive the contents of the new file. This is only a small
sample of standards and conventions which might be needed.
Much in these standards is embodied, in an EA/RA data base,
in the typing of entities and relationships. Both PCTE and CAIS
define an essential kernel of entity and relationship typing, but
fully support user extension. As will be discussed shortly,
CAIS-A has the additional capability for migrating such
information directly between systems, along with the contents of
the data base.
A second aspect of the EA/RA data base which must be
standardized and, in some cases, built into the structure and
implementation of the system services, is access control. In
this area CAIS-A has gone significantly further than PCTE. PCTE
provides only the first form of access discussed earlier, that of
informal partitioning of the data base for ownership, and
protection from accidental (unintended) or casual but undesired
access.
CAIS-A attempts to provide the attributes and relationships
necessary for a formal security system. In this case, for
accreditation as formally secure, the implementation would have
to be centered around a secure kernel which implemented the only
access to the data base. Much of this accreditation would thus
be based on the nature of the implementation. What CAIS-A
provides, however, is the conventions and standards upon which
such a system could be built.
A third area for conventions and standards is in support for
distribution. PCTE, in recognition of its intended configuration
of a Local Area Network (LAN) of workstations, provides some
support in its definition for such an implementation. Its
approach to distribution is basically to mandate the transparency
of distribution to the user, plus augment its services and
standards to accommodate distribution requirements. Note that
the PCTE network is uniform and configurable, with no hierarchy
of rights or responsibilities.
PCTE adds to its services and standards in the following
ways:
• All identification of objects, processes, users, message
queues, etc. is system wide and recognized throughout the
network without reference to its location.
• Process start-up may optionally specify a location for
execution, or may have default parameters which require
start-up on certain workstations.
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• The data base is maintained in separate volumes which are
mounted on the various workstations in the system. There
are no restrictions for relationships between objects on
different systems.
• Volumes and workstations are modeled as objects in the data
base with such modeling used to allow identification and
management of the resources.
• There are a certain number of services which directly
support network management.
• A standard model with kernel support services is provided
for replication of data with coordinated updates. This is
provided mostly to standardize implementations, i.e., it is
not generally visible to the typical interface set user. It
provides services, however, which aim to protect the system
from resource unavailability and network failures.
CAIS-A in meeting its intentions to support distribution
will necessarily define similar support for identification,
resource control and management, although there is no indication
that support for replication would be standardized as part of the
interface set (an omission that will retard standard support for
general redundancy management, unfortunately.) CAIS-A will,
however, make visible a standard for information interchange (the
common external form) which could apply to communications between
processors in a distributed implementation.
The final area for conventions and standards is in support
for system interaction• PCTE is essentially lacking in this
area, while CAIS-A's approach (as discussed earlier) is limited
to the definition of a common external form.
2.2.4 Design Issues in Defining a Common Interface Set in Ada
The final point of discussion on System Interface Set
specifications is that of some general Ada style and design
guidelines. This discussion is drawn from the recent effort to
define an Ada specification for PCTE (PCTE-Ada) based upon the
original specification written for C and UNIX (see PCTE Ada
Conceptual Design Document). The design issues which were
encountered can be grouped into issues in the use of the
following Ada capabilities:
private and limited private types in package
definitions, handles, naming and modularity of package
definitions, exceptions (a proper mechanism for error
reporting/handling), generics, and tasking.
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vSome similarity can be found in how CAIS-A and the Ada binding of
PCTE will be defined. CAIS-A will revise its error handling
mechanism to support just error reporting without the raising of
exceptions. While it is of academic interest to debate the
appropriate Ada style, compatibility with the C version of PCTE
is forcing this approach for PCTE-Ada. Also, a similar approach
to task execution within processes is being adopted.
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L3.0 Common Environment Architecture
The collection of computing environments to be managed for
future software systems will require capabilities to support
heterogeneity, physical distribution, cooperative autonomy,
safety and reliability in the execution environment.
Heterogeneity is often unavoidable due to growth and evolution
over the long operational life of a system. Physical distribution
and cooperative autonomy will be necessary to model the structure
of the disparate organizations involved in software system
development, integration and operation. Safety and reliability
are crucial to support critical systems upon which life and
property depend. This section discusses features which are
necessary to realize the entire set of dynamic capabilities as
well as reports on the existing static host environment models
that support a subset of these characteristics.
Three types of software environments, each with different
functional and operational requirements, can be identified: host,
target and integration. In the host environment, the primary
concern is the development and maintenance of software, as well
as associated documentation, requirements, specifications, design
rationale, etc. The characteristic host environment will be
resident on a general purpose operating system. In contrast, the
target environment application software and runtime support
modules will either reside on a general purpose operating system
or a subset of an operating system specifically tailored to the
supported application or, as discussed in Chapter i, reside on a
bare machine. The target environment is concerned with deployment
and operation of executable code, the preservation of semantic
integrity across disparate processors, and the realization of
hard real time constraints, possibly in the presence of software,
hardware, operational or environmentally induced faults. The
functions of the integration environment are: control of the
target environment baseline, including management of and
promotion to further baselines, and the integration of software
applications with hardware and operations.
Throughout the iterative, dynamic evolutionary life cycle of
a system, the software (in different forms: multiple versions,
different representations etc.) at one time or another, will
reside in at least one of, or migrate among, the three
environments. A Portable Common Execution Environment (PCEE)
model that eases the software environment interaction and
migration process among the three types of environments would
provide a solution that increases productivity and the support of
computer systems and software safety. A consolidated PCEE model
can facilitate the management of the life cycle complexity of
software systems in a similar manner across all three
environments.
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A PCEE is sustained at the stable interface set described by
the Ada packages selected from the Runtime and Extended Runtime
Libraries to be compiled into an appropriate RunTime Support
Environment (RTSE) for each processor. The PCEE can be defined
to consist of:
a set of policies for the management of services and
resources to be provided to the application program(s),
the set of management modules to enforce the policies,
and a set of rules for modification and extension.
Ideally, the PCEE should provide a common set of execution
services and resources to application software and the command
language that both hides and supports the use of differing
instruction set architectures, data bases, data communications
systems, bare machine implementations and operating systems
without regard to their underlying implementations. We propose
this common framework be modelled by a set of standard
interfaces, a common object representation, and a supporting
conceptual architecture.
3.1 The Model for Information and Process Management
Information is a fundamental resource and processing is a
fundamental service of a software system. In order for a system
to be most effective, the management scheme must accommodate the
capture, organization and retrieval of all relevant information.
Lessons learned through the development of successively more
sophisticated data base management systems and, more recently,
operating systems have shown that an entity/attribute
relationship/attribute (EA/RA) model is very powerful for
representing system level meta-data. An EA/RA model provides a
basis for describing the system in a manner which can be uniform
across host, target and integration environments. EA/RA supports
a layered approach with stable interface sets and stable
frameworks for organizing system resources. It can be used to
represent and enforce precise, abstract interface specifications
which are independent of the underlying manner in which they are
implemented. The IRDS draft standard for representing instances
of EA/RA models can be used to describe a formal semantic model
for PCEE information and process management. IRDS provides a
vendor independent, standard method for representing EA/RA models
across heterogeneous computers. An important feature of the IRDS
is the extensibility of the model.
3.2 Conceptual Architecture for the PCEE
The framework of the PCEE must be flexible enough to be
represented in a number of ways in order to accommodate tailoring
and extensibility in a large number of implementations. The PCEE
should also support the differing operational requirements of the
three environments. In the host environment, software is
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typically supported by the services of a general purpose
operating system. The target environment, in comparison, often
cannot tolerate the overhead of a general purpose operating
system. The PCEE can be considered a "virtual environment" which
resides on a RunTime System (RTS) (which is supported by the
Kernel). The Kernel "hides" features which are machine-dependent.
The PCEE should "hide" underlying system software implementations
ranging from a tailorable bare machine implementation to a
tailored operating system to a general purpose operating system
which co-exists with combinations of the first two.
A conceptual architecture for a PCEE is depicted in Figure 1-6.
Reconfigurability and performance tuning capabilities are
supported by the architecture for all three environments. The
architecture is based on a combination of layered and virtual
machine approaches: the lowest layer is the minimum functional
subset that isolate the hardware dependency features. This
minimal subset that supports the basic runtime support is called
the kernel. Additional runtime environment services will be
implemented via library modules and extended kernel functions.
These include runtime services such as virtual memory services,
file management, and atomic transactions.
Based upon the needs of the application code and the
configuration requirements of the intended execution site, the
runtime system is tailored by selections from a set of standard
library routines. These modules provide a layered architecture
on top of a virtual machine approach.
Subsetability and reconfigurability are accomplished by
first identifying the lowest layer as the minimum functional
subset that isolates the hardware dependency features. This
minimal subset forms the foundation of an extended machine for
the kernel that supports the basic Ada runtime support functions.
Typically, this may include functions such as I/O services,
memory management, process management, and interrupt handling.
Additional runtime environment services will be implemented as
incremental library extensions to the minimum kernel functions.
The extensions will use the kernel services only, to ensure
portability. These extended runtime environment services may
include services such as the Ada tasking, file management, the
dynamic memory management, and virtual memory services. Together
the kernel and the runtime support library routines for the
twelve component models discussed in Chapter 1 can be grouped
into safety kernels underneath a PCEE to maximize protection for
life and property.
To provide for selectability and configurability of
services, the interdependency of the runtime library elements
will be identified and minimized through the design process. The
set of special service functions, such as fault management,
configuration management, and system security can be provided as
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independent packages. These packages should be designed to
interface to the kernel functions only; there should be no direct
interaction among the packages. All RTSE library routines
execute as privileged code.
To support system tunability, certain functionalities can be
provided with multiple implementations, each with different
operational performance. For example, to support certain real-
time control processing, a special set of scheduling algorithms
and interrupt handling mechanisms will be required.
3.3 Additional Services of the PCEE
PCEE services required to support the collection of
distributed heterogeneous computing environments, as well as the
rationale behind the selection of particular services are
discussed in this section.
3.3.1 Security
In any significant software system, security must be
provided. A distributed system which supports a diverse user
group is particulary vulnerable to problems which result from
inappropriate access to information, processes, and devices. In
the minimal case, protection must be provided against inadvertent
access resulting from programmer error. Additionally, errors
resulting from the incorrect functioning of programs should be
prevented from causing catastrophic results by security built
into the PCEE. (That is, even "error free" programs cannot
always execute without error in a distributed and/or non-stop
environment.) At the other extreme, limited access to life,
property and other mission-dependent critical functions must be
provided against the hacker, the terrorist, and the disgruntled
employee. Secured processing may also be required. Context
sensitivity may also be at issue: an access operation that would
be allowed in a "secure" area might be prohibited depending on
the location of the terminal being used to effect the
transaction. Security should be provided according to the Trusted
Computer System (TCS), to at least the Multi-level security (MLS)
class B3.
From the discussion in Chapter 1, the reader is reminded
that, at least for the SSP, security is a "means-to-an-end",
whereas, safety is one of the "ends" which coexists with
fulfillment of mission requirements. Specifically, security is
one of at least 12 component models required as "means" to
support both of these "ends". Obviously any compromise of the
required component models underneath the PCEE (such as the
dynamic, multilevel security model) can endanger both safety and
mission. It is precisely for this reason that the PCEE interface
set must be specified in Ada rather than in any untyped langauge
such as C and the UNIX System V interfaces. The terms "secure
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UNIX" and "safe UNIX" area temporal oxymorons unless:
I) all features of UNIX are hidden beneath the
virtual interface set of a strongly typed
language such as Ada and
2) application programmers are denied access to
assemblers and other untyped languages.
The point is that the C compiler is an undefendable trap
door to the underlying features of UNIX and it can be used to
defeat the best efforts to support security, reliability, fault
tolerance, and safety. Even if such "secure" or --far more
difficult to develop -- "safe" UNIX implementations can be
demonstrated at acceptance test/delivery time (and some "secure"
ones have), mere mortals are unlikely to be able to sustain them
over the life cycle without lots of Divine intervention. This is
particulary true in distributed applicationsl
3.3.2 Cooperative Autonomy Among PCEEs
Not all of the potential interactions of a long-lived system
can be determined during its initial design. In order to provide
the most extensible basis for PCEEs, the capability for
coordinating control among PCEEs that may need to interact should
be provided. Conventions for determining the result or precedence
when coordination is required should be established within the
definition of the PCEE.
3.3.3 Process and Information Migration
Executing processes and information require the capability
to migrate to different locations to accommodate load balancing,
optimal access and/or fault tolerance. Load balancing is
concerned with optimizing and/or ensuring processing throughout a
system. Secondly, in order to expedite the transfer of frequently
accessed data, movement of data (or procedures) may be necessary.
A third, and potentially most important, reason for allowing
processes to migrate to other processors is to provide critical
functions in a fault-tolerant manner to support safety. In the
event that a system recognizes the imminent failure of a
processing resource, the most important functions and information
would have the capability to move or be moved to other sites.
3.3.4 Heterogeneous Processors
During the existence of a lohg-lived system, the
incorporation of new hardware technology may be beneficlal to the
system. New technology may be necessary to accommodate evolving
needs or changing objectives. In order to accommodate new
hardware, a PCEE may require support for a heterogeneous set of
processors. To accomplish transactions between these differing
processors, a common external format for representing data and
data structures may be necessary (see the discussion in Chapter
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w2). Common formats provide the mechanism for information
exchange between machines whose underlying data representations
are not compatible.
3.3.5 Communication
Communication, whether the underlying processors are similar
or different, must be managed in a manner that supports remote
communications, asynchronous signals and the Ada rendezvous.
Remote communications are best provided through the use of the
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) which is necessary when a called
subprogram resides on a remote processor. The need for
asynchronous signals arises when a condition needs to be
communicated, without the signalling processor relinquishing or
slowing the execution of its thread of control. For both safe and
--less demanding-- fault tolerant inter-task communication of
application information or control synchronization, the concept
of the Ada rendezvous is needed. Remote procedure calls must
adhere to the semantics of the Ada language (i.e. behave as if
the procedures were resident on a single processor). (see Rogers
and McKay, 1986). Asynchronous signals, which do not wait for a
response, provide communication services while allowing the
signalling processor to continue its work. Additionally, the PCEE
should suppor_ the concept of the Ada rende_vQus ac;os_ the
Detwork. _he rendezvous provides a semantic model for two
communicating autonomous threads of control with defined
exception conditions in any of the three: calling task, called
task, and communications link between the tasks. Beyond the
semantics of communications, a model for implementing the actual
transaction is provided by the International Standards
Organization/Open Systems Interconnection (ISO/OSl) model. Within
the model there are seven layers. Each layer provides a different
portion of the required service, so that the amount of overhead
incurred can be tailored depending on the complexity of the
transmission. The ISO/OSI model is an emerging standard which
will provide a uniform representation for asynchronous and RPC
communications. However, for the SSP, the OSI model should be
extended to include the Ada rendezvous semantics to maximize
support for safety in a fault tolerant environment with
distributed non-stop components.
3.3.6 Transparency of Distribution
Distribution of logical entities within the PCEE should be
addressed at the most general level. Distribution across Remote
Area Networks (RAN) of integrated Local Area Networks (LAN)
requires solutions to the problems of unreliable communications,
determination of an appropriate unit of distribution and unique
naming (across networked interacting processors). The model
should incorporate transparency of location, replication,
parallelism and fault-tolerance and a "sufficiently precise"
granularity of control. The amount of transparency provided
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determines the amount of overhead incurred by the system.
Ultimately, it also determines the safety and extensibility of
the systems life cycle.
3.3.6.1 Unreliable Communications
In addition to addressing the types of communication
required and the manner in which they should be implemented, the
problems of dealing with "unreliable" communications links must
be addressed. Unreliable communications are especially apparent
in remotely connected systems. (This is exacerbated when the
links are subject to the laws of orbital mechanics.) In such
systems, especially when communication links are not direct
hardware connections, problems can occur in establishing and
maintaining transmissions. In order to assure "normally" correct
communications mechanisms, the services provided by the ISO/OSI
model may often be satisfactory. However, fault tolerant
operations which the safety of life and property depend upon are
far easier to sustain with support for a robust model of
cooperating, autonomous threads of control which effect
distributed, nested transactions. The authors believe the Ada
rendezvous is the best available model for this purpose and
strongly recommend its addition to the OSI model.
3.3.6.2 Unit of Distribution
The choice of a source-code level unit of distribution is
concerned with source-level language visibility rules, which, in
distributed RTE's, is a determining factor in feasibility of
implementation. In Ada, the unit of distribution can range from
a named entity to a compilation unit. Distribution of logical
entities, at least to the task level, will be necessary in order
to provide dynamic fault tolerance. The determination of the unit
of distribution which would be appropriate for PCEE connections
is beyond the scope of this paper, but is critical to the design
of the PCEE. The most apparent distribution certainty determined
by the SERC team and others is that the unit of software
distribution supported by the PCEE must be below the program
level and at least to the task level. Otherwise the risk of
being unable to sustain the SSP life cycle requirements for both
mission and safety support is unacceptably amplified.
3.3.6.3 Unique Identification
Operating systems support objects, such as files,
directories, processes, services and I/O devices. A unique name,
in a distributed environment, helps to protect the objects in the
environment from incorrect manipulation. A method for the unique
identification of objects, streams, and transactions, throughout
a distributed environment, which complements the choice of unit
of distribution, is required. Universally unique identifiers are
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necessary for configuration management. They are also required to
locate entities that may migrate throughout a vast network or to
restore entities that existed previously. They are also
extremely useful in the safest and fastest possible replacement
of an entity that was just recognized as having failed in a non-
stop, fault tolerant environment.
3.3.7 Transaction Management
Transaction management is concerned with the organization of
actions into groups which can be monitored by the PCEE.
Transactions should be able to be described, manipulated and
controlled in much the same way that information within the PCEE
is handled. Transactions management requires the capability to
effect atomic actions, synchronization, inheritance of
capabilities, and control stable storage. Transaction support may
also require support across a distributed system, as discussed
above. Atomic actions are perceived by the PCEE as one
uninterruptable action to either advance to the next stable state
or remain at the current one. Physical atomic actions can be
combined with "vertical" atomic actions to provide sets called
transactions. Nested, distributed transactions are the most
parsimonious, efficient and robust of the known ways to support
safe, distributed systems. If any component part of the action
fails, either a recovery option is successful or the whole action
is considered failed. Values associated with the transaction are
not updated. Of course, use of expendable quantities, such as
firing a rocket, or creation of by-products, such as heat
generated by the running of a machine, must be taken into
consideration when the initial state is "reinstated".
Synchronization provides a mechanism for limiting access to an
entity so that multiple actions do not produce indeterminate
results. Inheritance allows "parent" processes to assimilate the
knowledge of their subordinates once the subordinate terminates.
Transaction management is an integral part of providing a
stable baseline. A stable baseline allows each process in the
system (to the desired level of granularity) to interact with the
system in a manner which provides "fire walls". That is, a
process which does not complete successfully cannot impact an
unrelated process. The stable baseline is advanced from one
stable state to the next. A stable state is a description of the
relevant portion of the system data base which can only be
changed by correctly completed transactions. Semantic integrity
across environments, including type protection, in terms of Ada
semantics, is required throughout the persistent data base. That
is, values for a transaction are not written until the entire
transaction has successfully completed. In this way, each action
terminates correctly or has (virtually) no effect on the system.
3.3.8 Granularlty of Representation
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The level at which a software processing entity is
considered by the environment to be a "black box" is the lowest
level at which a representation is supported. For instance, if
the granularity of representation is an Ada program, then any
task spawned by that program is not recognized by the
environment. This has ramifications if the parent task becomes
abnormal, especially in a distributed environment. Since the
environment has no knowledge of the subordinate task, it cannot
employ a mechanism for removing the task from the environment. If
another copy of the program is started and spawns the task again,
the continued functioning of the originally spawned task may lead
to undesirable results. Granularity of control should be defined
for performance measures (design phase), debugging (coding
phase), process monitoring (operations phase) and assessment of
hardware and software changes (operations/maintenance phase). The
granularity of control will dictate the ability to manage
multiple command streams. Each body of a distributed subprogram,
task or package in a state of execution, while they possess a
thread of control should be accessible through PCEE interfaces.
Facilities for maintaining the transaction status for transaction
management (as discussed above) should also be associated with
each subprogram, task or main program. By providing this level of
control, a fault-tolerant process is better able to assess its
state of execution and determine the need for recovery
procedures. Note that the single process control block
representation of an entire program (as in UNIX, CAIS or PCTE)
can not support these needs. However, a legal extension to CAIS
that could support these needs is conceptually straight-forward.
Simply have the process control block of the program represent
aggregate views of all its tasks while allowing an expanded view
of the program showing a control block structure for each thread-
of-control's participation in the aggregate. (See Rogers, K.,
1986.)
3.3.9 Interoperability
Interoperability in the minimal sense, is concerned with the
capability to move source code among processors in the
environment without changing the functionality of the software.
Interoperability can be extended to include provisions for common
external data formats which would allow tools to generate or
manipulate information used or created by other tools. If
interoperability among tools is provided, an Ada Program Support
Environment (APSE) could be created from individual tools. In
this way, the APSE could be tailored to the particular
application under development. Interoperability of control
streams implies that commands should have the same effect (within
reasonable limits) anywhere in the environment.
Data,
across the
processors.
tools and control streams should be interoperable
distributed network, extendin_ to heterogeneous
Requirements for a common external form may be
46
wnecessary to implement these functions in an autonomous manner.
In order to provide interoperability for individual tools,
abstract data types (such as for a symbol table) will need to be
defined. These types will have to be entered into the data base
by the producing tool (for instance, a compiler) for later access
by "consuming" tools (e.g., symbolic debugger). EA/RA models
represented in IRDS standard form can be enormously useful in
supporting such interoperability. (See the Chapter 2 discussion
of Common External Form.)
3.3.10 Optimizing the PCEE Goals
The PCEE should balance the life cycle goals of safety,
performance, portability, adaptability, cost effectiveness, and
stable baselines across the host, target, and integration
environments. Reasonable trade-offs among these goals are
necessary to manage distributed, non-stop, large and complex
systems. The PCEE should provide support for multiprocessing
capabilities to provide for concurrent and non-stop operations.
It should build on the guidelines established in the ARTEWG
Catalog of Interface Features and Options (CIFO) to provide
runtime support (see ARTEWG CIFO, July 1986).
3.4 Existing Models and Paradigms
If an existing set of models and paradigms is not exploited
in defining the PCEE, a unique set will have to be created. The
use of existing models and paradigms provides not only a
demonstration of feasibility but also a supply of tools that may
have application within the PCEE. Two existing environment
models, the CAIS and the PCTE, were studied as possible
foundations for the PCEE.
3.4.1 Common APSE Interface Set
The current CAIS, MIL-STD 1838, is an extensible baseline
from which a complementary PCEE can be developed. The successor
to the CAIS is referred to as CAIS-A (note that the descriptions
of the possible contents of CAIS-A are the CAIS contractor's
current thinking and are subject to change). The authors believe
CAIS-A can and will further the baseline established by the CAIS
toward the complementary goals of a PCEE.
Object management within the CAIS is modelled by nodes, and
is based on the EA/RA model. Nodes have properties and
attributes that can be read using CAIS interfaces. The node model
is designed to execute processes in substantially the same way,
except for timing. This fulfills the PCEE requirement for an
EA/RA-based system. A further extension that would make the CAIS
implementation more compatible with the desired features of the
PCEE would be to use the IRDS standard for EA/RA.
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The CAIS provides a virtual host environment system
interface between the virtual operating system (represented by
the Kernel APSE) and the environment tools; therefore, it can be
implemented on either an existing general purpose operating
system or a tailored operating system. In this manner, the CAIS
provides a "virtual environment" which could be extended to
support all three environments that comprise the PCEE.
Security and performance features will be enhanced (in CAIS-
A) in order to provide at least Trusted Computer System class B3
multi-level security (MLS). (Formal verification is required for
a higher classification.) The incorporation of this class of
security meets the currently perceived need for dynamic security
within the PCEE. Implementation of security facilities in a
modular manner should allow the PCEE to utilize only the
necessary portions of the CAIS-A implementation and only the
necessary portions of the security class currently imposed.
CAIS-A will also address the facilities that will be
required to coordinate actions among cooperating CAISes. The
issues that are addressed by CAIS-A will provide at least a basis
for determining the interactions among cooperating yet autonomous
PCEE implementations.
In addition, CAIS-A will address interfaces that exist among
multiple CAIS implementations (across RAN's and LAN's). One
aspect of the network implementation will be interfaces which
will allow processes to migrate to other processors. CAIS-A will
allow support for heterogeneous processors. Some support will be
given to a common external data format, to allow communication of
data and information between differing processors. Unique names
for objects will also be addressed, as will some support for at
least single-level atomic transactions.
Within the PCEE definition, support for RAN's of LAN's will
be required. The underlying assumptions for modeling RAN's can be
used as a basis for PCEE LANs. The basis can be extended to
include those assumptions to account for the distinctive features
of LAN nodes. However, the reverse --i.e., scaling-up-- is not
true. As an example, SQL's single level transactions are
believed to be inadequate for supporting safety during RAN
operations. Furthermore the life cycle cost effectiveness and
performance of single level transactions is believed to be
significantly worse than for PCEE support of distributed, nested
transactions.
Neither the current CAIS nor the plans for CAIS-A include
provision for the types of communication that are necessary for a
PCEE. The CAIS also does not provide support for all three of the
environments of the PCEE. The current goal of both CAIS and CAIS-
A is to provide interfaces for the host environment.
Additionally, support for a unit of distribution below the Ada
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wprogram level, interoperability among programs, and transaction
management would be necessary extensions to CAIS-A, in order for
it to provide the functionality needed within the PCEE.
3.4.2 Portable Common Tool Environment (PCTE)
Selected features of the PCTE should also be incorporated
into the PCEE baseline. Although there are some features which
are common between the PCTE and the CAIS, there are also
differences. The PCTE provides some features which go beyond CAIS
and CAIS-A toward providing facilities necessary for the PCEE.
These PCTE features can be considered a further step toward a
conceptual and physical framework for integrating the tools and
rules for a PCEE. This framework is supported by the PCTE Ada
Specification.
In the PCTE, the first four layers of the seven layer
ISO/OSI model are implemented to support distribution at the LAN
level. The lack of support for the upper three layers is a most
unfortunate shortcoming of the current PCTE. LAN support also
includes the concept of agents, servers and clients which is a
significant strength. Messages and message queues allowing
executing programs to exchange information directly are also
provided by the PCTE interface specifications. The existing
implementations of PCTE can be evaluated as a starting point for
the PCEE implementation of RAN's of integrated LAN's.
The PCTE provides support for both distributed nested
transactions and the implementation of replication facilities for
entities in distributed environments. It provides mechanisms to
synchronize data access. These features will be necessary within
the PCEE, to provide transactions and redundancy management, in
order to provide a stable baseline.
Example PCEE features needed for Space Station which the
PCTE does not support include security, automatic information and
process migration, granularity below the Ada program level,
tolerance of unreliable communications and unique naming. See
Figure 3-1 for a comparison of certain PCEE, CAIS, CAIS-A, PCTE
features.
49
fFeature
Status
Validation Suite
Basis
Representation
Information
Management
Kernel
Security
i Cooperating
Environments
Location
Processor
Types
Common External
Data Format
Communications
Implementation
Distribution
Unique Names
Transaction
Management
Data Access
Stable Storage
Granularity of
Representation
Interoperability
Goals
Support for
Multiprocessors
Support for
nonfunctional
requirements
Environments
I/O
Figure
PCEE
Definition Stage
Required
AR I P-.WGCIFO and
Clear Lake Model
Object
Extensible EAJRA
(based on IRDS)
"bare machine',
operating system
Full TCS "Puce Book"
required
Migratable
Heterogeneous
required
Full OSI
RANs of
Integrated LANs
Objects, Processes,
Transactions,
Relationships,
and Attributes
Distributed Nested
Synchronized
required
Each thread of control
for each program
data, tools, control
}ortability, performance
stable baseline & safety
across all environments
required
ARTEWG CIFO and
Clear Lake Model
Host,Target
and Integration
CAIS
MIL-STD
In Progress
unique
CAIS-A
In Progress
In Progress
i--
C_S
Node Node
unique ENRA unique ENRA
"bare machine",
operating system
minimal
not supported
Fixed
• I-L_
Homogeneous
not supported
NA
single site
Nodes,
Relationships,
and Attributes
NA
NA
NA
program
data
portability,
performance
NA
NA
Host
"bare machine"
operating system
TCS B3 class MLS
supported
Migratable
Heterogeneous
some support
TBD
Some RANand
I.AN support
Nodes,
Relationships,
and Attirbutes
Single Level
NA
NA
prog ra m
data
portability,
performance
NA
NA
Host
graphics, windows character-oriented graphics and
and other devices terminals windows
3-1 Comparison of Features for a PCEE
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PCTE
Completed
Completed
('based on XP¢)
UNIX SVlD
Object
unique ENRA
operating
system
minimal
I.AN only
LAN migratable
Homogeneous
minimal support
Four layers of OSI
LAN
Objects,
Relationships,
and Attributes
Distributed
Nested
Synchronized
NA
program
data
portability,
performance,
stable base
NA
graphics and
windows •
NA
Host
(some Target)
3.5 Considerations for PCEE Guidelines
Inclusion of the capabilities discussed above into a standard
for a PCEE impose constraints on both the RTSE as well as tools
within the environment. Requirements for recognition of
individual threads of control levies requirements on the RTSE not
only to provide "hooks" into that type of information (which
extends to dynamic task creation and retirement) but also creates
a requirement for a "standard" manner of providing that
information (across different ISA's). One solution might be to
include this as an optional EA/RA represented feature within an
extended runtime library (XRTL).
The choice of an appropriate unit of distribution also
impacts the amount of information that must be provided by the
compiler to the RTSE. The smaller the unit of distribution after
a certain point, the greater the amount of information and,
therefore, overhead is required. The amount of overhead incurred
must not be so high as to negatively impact the performance of
software in the target environment. On the other hand, the
larger the unit of distribution, after a certain point, the less
opportunity to exploit parallel and distributed processors which
also begins to negatively affect performance.
3.6 Conclusions
The PCEE should provide a flexible, extensible model which
addresses the three types of program execution environments. The
features of the PCEE should be defined in a modular manner, so
that when an environment is "scaled down", the overhead of a full
set of capabilities is not imposed. Useful existing and emerqing
standards, such as IRDS and OSI should be employed and extended
wherever necessary to eliminate duplication of effort and derive
benefits from the corresponding development of conforming tools.
The PCEE model must be robust enough to provide the required
services, but at the same time must be easily implemented,
tailorable, and extensible (extending to the capability to be
implemented in a number of different ways). Finally, the choices
for features, such as the granularity of control, should be made
in a manner that provides for a technically feasible and
economically reasonable solution.
v
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4.0 Recommendations and Summary Discussions
The findings of this research team lead to five suggested
actions:
i. Adopt CAIS as a necessary and extensible subset of the
System Interface Set (SIS) and User Interface Set (UIS)
of the distributed host environments (i.e., the SSE)
and the integration environment (yet to be fully
defined).
• Publicly declare NASA's intention to help shape,
develop, and utilize an upward compatible CAIS version
which will combine the best features of the current
CAIS and PCTE, and also meet specific needs of the
Space Station Program including the dynamic perspective
of the Portable Common Execution Environment (PCEE).
Discussion:
There are currently seven working prototypes of CAIS that
have been reported in the public domain. Several more are on the
way. Although they are not production quality, the reports
clearly indicate that CAIS does indeed facilitate both developing
and acquiring portable tools. By contrast, there exists one
reported prototype implementation and one production quality
implementation of PCTE. Unfortunately, the production quality
version currently uses C language interfaces and therefore would
be completely unacceptable for the life cycle of the Space
Station Program. However, the recent conversion of these C
specifications to an Ada specification set holds great promise
for a subsequent production quality implementation featuring the
advantages of building and importing tools which adhere to the
Ada interfaces.
From the perspective of stable frameworks to host tools and
rules, the current PCTE has many desirable features not found in
the current CAIS. Unfortunately, the pragmatic considerations
that led to the early availability of a production quality
implementation of these desirable features are entirely too
dependent upon obsolete models and paradigms within the
underlying C language and UNIX System V. Therefore, CAIS-A has
the unique opportunity of benefiting, in the long term, from the
valuable lessons learned from working with both earlier versions
of the CAIS and PCTE.
3. Publicly acknowledge that the
simultaneously support:
requirements to
building-in and sustaining safety while
meeting mission requirements and
meeting future requirements for extensibility and
adaptability
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are issues-at-high-risk in the critical path of the
Space Station Program. Furthermore, recognize that
none of the current test bed activities now underway
are specifically focused on these issues.
Q Establish a fully instrumented, highly reconfigurable
PCEE test bed as soon as possible to support empirical
verification and validation of the concepts and
requirements of a PCEE intended to facilitate
simultaneous support of:
building in and sustaining safety while
meeting mission requirements and
meeting future requirements for extensibility and
adaptability
in large, complex, non-stop, distributed systems such
as the Space Station Program•
Discussion: From a logical perspective, the fully
instrumented, highly reconfigurable PCEE test bed would be used
to support:
of:
proof-of-concept demonstrations
empirical evaluations
and verification and validation
• concepts . models
• principles . methods
and associated:
• standards . practices
• guidelines . policies
which are related to developing and sustaining a PCEE appropriate
for the SSP life cycle•
From a physical perspective, the PCEE test bedwould be used
to support:
• proof-of-concept demonstrations
• empirical evaluations
and verification and validation
of implementations of PCEE:
• services and resources
• stable interface sets
• layers
• stable frameworks
. reusable runtime library modules
• mappings from conceptual to implementation models
• mapping to-and-from the requirements and tools of the
host and integration environments
• mappings to-and-from other NASA test beds and
subsystems (e.g., Technical Management and Information
System, TMIS).
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Combing the benefits of these two perspectives, the PCEE
test bed would be an invaluable resource to the SSP to
facilitate:
• early emulation of an appropriate working environment
• early demonstration of the fault tolerance, security,
and other components which support safety in the
distributed target environment
• the study of integration issues in an end-to-end
environment which is large, complex, non-stop, and
distributed
. the study of one more aspects of the SSP life cycle
management of:
• complexity
• safety and quality
• cost effectiveness
• technology transfer for the benefit of NASA and
NASA's constituency.
early evolvement and evaluation of the distribution of
Ada entities among parallel and distributed resources
other important studies which evaluate and lower risk
in the execution environment of the SSP.
5. Because major SSP contracts such as TMIS and SSE have
recently been awarded, publically declare the
assignment of responsibility to an appropriate SSP
office or working group to effect the integration of
the System Interface Set (SIS) and User Interface Set
(UIS) not only across the three environments (host,
target, and integration) but also across the various
SSP contracts (SSE, TMIS, DDT&E, etc.). This task
should begin as soon as possible to reduce unnecessary
risk, costs, and complexity.
Discussion:
Reports such as this one and the SERC memos on issues of
transistioning from CAIS to CAIS-A (5 May 1987) and on
computer systems and software safety (15 June 1987) could be
used to stimulate discussion and planning of an initial
agenda•
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A PROPOSED FRJ_qEWORK FOR THE TOOLS AND RULES TO SUPPORT THE
LIFE CYCLE OF THE SPACE STATIOH PROGRAM
Charles W. McKay
Software Engineering Research Center
University of Houston CLeat Lake
Abstract
In 1986, the author was the leader of a
team coemissloned to produce two reports
for NASA concerning the requirelants for
a life cycle, Software Support
Environment (axE)for the Space Station
Program (SSP). The interim report
identified over ?0 functional tooll and
seven standards or proposed standards
that would be helpful in extending a
Coaa_n APSE Interface Set (CAXS)
conforming Nlnimal toolset of an Ads e
Programming Support Environment (HAPSE)
into an appropriate SSE for aupportinQ
the life cycle of the SSP. The final
report described the requirements for in
integrating foundation and framework to
host the "tools and rules = identified i_
the interim report. _11is paper
amplifies two vital boundary points
considered by these reportst the
proposed, principal goal and the
proposed means for organising a model of
the SSE to affect this goal.
Xntroduction
This paper addresses two boundary points
in environments which support the life
cycle of large, coq)lex, non-stop,
distributed systems such as the Spice
Station Program (SSP). A useful model
which depicts systems-level considerations
in addressing these issues consists of
three macroscopic, hierarchical levelst
goals and objectives, strategies and
tactics, and means.
?he two focal points of this paper are the
extremes of this hierarchical spectrum.
The first is to state the goal for such
applications and to identify four of it's
most important components. The second
identifies three of the lowest levels of
appropriate means to achieve this goalt
concepts, principles and models. Since
the ease of this paper cannot permit an
adequate explanation of the many linkages
and considerations necessary in bridQing
this spectrum, the reader should be aware
eAda is I registered trademark of the US
Governsent, Ads Joint Program Office
of the author's rationale for addressing
these two widely separated sets of issues.
The author Is convinced that the =means =
represented by conventional designs of
_t of the off-the-shelfl operating
systems, data base management systems and
data coiml_inic&tionl SyStems ire iflidequite
to support the goals Of the $$P regardless
of how veil stated Ire the objectives and
how carefully chosen are the strategies
and tactics to be used in organising,
developing and applying more traditional
concepts, principles end models as the
means to do the Job. Therefore, 8
=b<)ttom-up e presentation Of proposed means
believed to be adequate for the challenges
will be described as follovst objects,
Stable Xnterface Sets (SXS), layering,
Stable Frameworks (SF), conceptual and
iRpleuentation mK_els of a computer
systems and software support environment.
These descriptions amplify related
portions of the two reports referred to in
the bibliography.
An Appropriate Goal
The team believes the major goal of the
SSP should emphasize both process and
product. The product should enable
mankind to derive the benefits of
colonizing and industrializing that
portion of our solar system from the earth
to the moon in preparation for future
programs which extend into deeper specs.
?he process should enable distributed
tom from government, industry and
academia to learn how to incrementally
develop and continuously sustain large,
complex, non-atop, distributed system
which _st be trusted to simultaneously
satisfy a variety of critical requirements
throughout the life cycle, tour important
parts of this goal are believed to be,
1. To enable the successful life cycle
management of the coaple:ity of the
computer systems and software integr-
ation and configuration management.
(le, to enable the complexity tO be
controlled over the ll|e cycle of a
successful project.)
2. To support systems and 0oftware level
safety and quality control throughout
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4,
the life cycle. {Ie, to continuously
protect life and property.)
To support systems and software level
cost e[fectiveness throughout the fife
cycJe, fie, to enable mankind to af-
ford deriving the benefits of the
program.)
To transfer into practice those
aspects o( the systems and software
engineering support environment which
can increase the systems and software
productivity, safety and lower llfe
cycle costs of other projects through-
out NASA •nd NASA's constituency.
Means
=The third rule was to commence my
reflections with objects which were
the simplest and e•slest to understand,
and rise thence, little by little, to
knowledge of the most complex."
(Desc•rte•, Discourse on Method t About
1620 AO
The discussion of means will begin with •
description of the fundamental building
block: the object. Although high level
languages such e= Ads can certainly be
abused so that the desirable properties to
be discussed are compromised, the
remainder of this paper will assume that
the facilities of the language will be
properly used. Subsequent discussion of
means will be based upon higher levels of
object groupings to •chieve the desired
properties for the systems and software
support environment.
I. Objects
As used in this paper, objects may refer
to either logical or physical entities.
All objects must have abstract
specifications that answer three
questions: What services and resources
are to be provided by the object? How
well are these services and resources to
be provided7 Under what circumstances are
they to be provided? This abstract
specification can be considered to provide
a "virtual interface = to the object. From
the perspective of users, the abstr•ct
specification also provides the "one way
in/one way Out = for the object. Since
objects are intended to communicate by
messages, the virtual interface can be
used as an inventory of the message
requirements. Abstract specifications •re
always to be separately compilable from
the implementation part of the object if
an implementation part exists.
The implementation part,lf it exists,
hides all design decisions regarding the
object. Trade offs between: hardware and
software, algorithms and data structures,
and traditlon•l versus A! design
techniques are encapsulated inside this
ubject implementation. Other information
which may also be hidden inside the
implementation part may include knowledge
that this is • complex object which is
cq_posed of several other objects. For
example, a component written in assembly
language can be encapsulated inside an
object body. Since users of the object
oan only see the abstract specification,
access to the code segments and data
structures of the assembly language
routine would be hidden from the users and
controlled inside the inlplementation part.
For objects implemented in Ads, the
visibility and scoping rules are specified
in the language reference manual. Details
of authorization and enforcement of acres•
control rights which are more restrictive
than these visibility and scoping rules
are systems level issues beyond the
applications source code level.
Entity-Attribute/Relationshlp-Attrlbute
(£A/RA} models will be proposed in the
next topic as the means to gain these
additional and desirable controls.
2. Stable Interface Sets (SIS)
Stable Interface Sets (SIS) c•n be formed
from • union of the abstract
specifications of a group of objects which
are designed to contribute to • common
level of functionality and to offer the
same level of visibility. Three SIS
requirements listed below •re best
understood by considering the unique
perspective listed for each.
I. From the perspective of a complete in-
ventory, an SIS is • virtual interface
set resulting from the union of all
abstract specifications of the objects
designed to be visible at this inter-
face. fie, the tOtal collection of
all the services and resources to be
provided at the SXS, how well and
under what clrcummtsnces.)
2. From the perspective of any given ob-
ject within an SIS regarding it's re-
lationship to other objects in the
SiS, there should exist s formal model
in £A/RA form describing:
the "need-to-know =•nd =right-to-
know" visibility among all objects
of the SIS
the grouping of objects into dis-
creet sets of services and classes
of services within each of the
sets.
The benefit of the formal _K_el is not
only to allow automated aids to assist
in checks for completeness and consis-
tency but also to provide rules for
considering proposed extensions and
modifications. The concept of classes
of services within • given set of
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services allows all external users ot
the service met to have access based
upon their authorization and their
context of operation. (le, there ate
things that must/should still be done
even when doing everything is no long-
er an option.)
3. From the perspective of external ob-
Jects outside the SIS, a formal model
in EA/RA form Is used to describe:
exactly what sets and classes of
services are to be visible to the
object
the protocols (necessary steps} and
access control to be imposed upon
the external object and It's use of
the services and resources provided
at the SIS.
3. Layering
Systems should be constructed in a
hierarchy of layers where each layer is a
Stable Interface Set. The layers
contribute to firewalling of faults that
occur within s layer. Upper layers ere
often able to compensate for faults which
occurred in lower layers. 1_ne successive
layers of trust explicitly reflect both
the functional architecture of the system
and the differing degrees of criticality
associated with the functionality of the
layer. Similarly, faults and higher
layers are firewalled to prohibit
contamination in lower layers (although
the lower layers may not be able to
compensate for the higher level faults).
Such layering promotes isolation of
related units of functionality and
separates the concerns of =what" from
"how = . Security, integrity and
reliability are three critical concerns
that can now be addressed appropriately
within each layer.
4. Stable Frameworks (SF}
The three requirements for Stable
Frameworks [SF) are:
1. Within any layer a collection of
closely related objects that should be
regarded and maintained as a unit
shall be identifiable by unique at-
tributes.
2. The collection of objects within a
layer which are to be identified ms
a unit via the unique attributes can
be treated as "strongly typed'. That
is, a complete determination can be
made of legal values and legal opera-
tions for SF's of this type.
]. Within any layer, a formal model in
EA/RA form can be used to represent
the relationships of the strongly
typed SF's tO other strongly typed
SF's both within and external to the
layer.
As an example of the use of stable
frameworks, consider the systems level
requirements analysis for the Space
Station Program. One contractor might
be responsible for determining the re-
qulrements for the Space Station it-
self while two other contractors are
respectively responsible for deter-
_Inlng the requirements for the or-
bltai transfer vehicle and the free
flying platforms. Therefore, in the
llfe cycle project object base, the
basellned requirements for the Space
Station will be uniquely identified by
at least the following attributes:
systems requirements analysis phase,
persistent object base layer (this
assumes they are approved and under
baseline control}, Space Station re-
quirements. Similarly, the same lay-
er of the project object base might
contain a stable framework consisting
of all objects with the unique at-
tribute identifiers: systems re-
quirements phase, persistent object
base layer, orbital transfer vehicle.
These SF's may be regarded as strong-
ly typed with £A/RA models depicting
their relationships to other SF's plus
the access control that will protect
the products of one contractor from
accidental corruption by another.
5. The Conceptual Model
The top of the attached figure depicts a
conceptual model of the life cycle to be
addressed by a systems and software
support environment. The rectangles
labeled P 1 through P 6 represent phases
of the life cycle. The elongated S shaped
figure to the right of the ellipse is
marked P 7, maintenance and operation.
This icon represents successive iterations
through the first six phases. For the
purposes of this model, a phase may be
defined as: a discrete period of time
and activities delineated by a beginning
and an ending event for each iteration in
the incremental evolution of the llfe
cycle.
The first phase, P I, represents system
requirements analysis. All subsequent
phases may involve three sets of staggered
activities in time. For example, P 2
begins with the translation of s section
of the system requirements into software
requirements. In turn, these two will
later contribute to s P 2 activity
referred to as hardware requirements
analysis. Finally, s third P 2 activity
will use these three sets of results for
ode rat ions I requ irement s analys is.
Similarly, the resolution into software,
hardware, and operational concerns are
mapped in staggered time to D 3,
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preliminary design, and the subsequent
phases. The fourth phase is detailed
design. This precedes P 5, coding and
unit test, which exlsts in a staggered
time relationship to ongoing activities of
P 6, computer software component
integration.
The closed pairs of parallel arcs
represent documentation requirements
tailored from POD Standard 2167 to meet
the needs of NASA. For example, the
closed pair of parallel arcs separating
the rectangles for P I and P 2 represents
the systems requirements analysis
documentation. This documentation set
creates a vertical stable interface set
separating each iteration of systems
requirements analysis on the left from the
beginning of a transformation into
software requirements on the right. For
example, the first iteration of systems
requirements analysis, P I, might satisfy
a minimum treshold of requirements for a
small, identifiable segment of the systems
requirements documentation. When this
threshold is reached, automatically a
signal is triggered to freeze the
attributes of that segment of the document
and to signal the quality management team
they can begin verification and validation
(shown in the small circles). Upon the
recommendation of the quality management
team to project management, a
configuration management decision {shown
in the tab as "SDR', system design review)
determines whether this portion of the
document should be placed under
configuration management. The decision is
forwarded to the project object base which
also triggers both a report to the team
doing systems requirements analysis and a
signal to initiate activities of the team
who will take this portion of the systems
requirements and begin transforming them
into software requirements. Later, the
software requirements analysis will create
a corresponding segment of the software
requirement analysis document shown as the
closed pair of parallel arcs separating P
2 and P 3. When a threshold for this
segment of the document is reached,
automatlcally the system is triggered to
freeze the attributes of this part of the
work so that the results maybe evaluated
by the quality management team. Other
documents identified in the figure include
the: software design specification
document, software design documentation,
software development documentation. As
stated earlier, the circles represent
verification and validation activities by
members of the quality management team.
These activities are in accord with a
version of POD Standard 2168 tailored to
meet the needs of NASA,
The tabs represent configuration
management decision points. The first one
shown on the left is the "SRR', system
requirement review. 7his represents the
decision of the cllent to award the
contract for a particular portion of the
automated system to a contractor. At this
point, an instantiatlon of the "tools and
rules" plus the environmental framework is
established for the contractor and the
contract becomes one of the first items in
the llfe cycle project object base to
enter configuration control. Subsequent
configuration management decisions are
identified from left to right as: system
design review, software specification
review, preliminary design review,
critical design review, test readiness
review, functional configuration audit,
physical configuration audit, formal
qualification review.
The ellipse which is to the left of the P
9 icon represents acceptance testing.
This is a transition milestone from the
acceptance of a developed baseline for the
target environment to the maintenance" and
operation that sustains the baseline in
the future. The life cycle project object
base shown at the right hand side of the
figure supports: systems engineering,
software engineering, hardware
engineering, operational engineering, and
the management of people and logistics.
(Please note: the icons and general
organization of the conceptual model were
adapted from McDermid and Ripken, 1984.)
6. An Implementation Model
In contrast to phases, activities have
been defined as: the process of
performing a series of actions or tasks.
Thus, some activities take place within
phases. Others, such as quality
management, integration and configuration
management, information and object
managemen t , document generation, and other
forms of communication, are pervasive
throughout the life Cycle. Together, the
concepts of phases, activities, a llfe
cycle pro)ect object base, and required
documentation as stable interface sets
help to explain the mapping of the
conceptual model to the implementation
model at the bottom of the figure.
From the perspective of the users of the
environment, the first stable interface
set which is experienced is known as the
"User Inter_ace Set" (UIS). The UIS is
defined as a part of the Common APSE
Interface Set (CAIS). It provldes an
integrated view of the users access to the
tools and other services and resources of
the environment vla their terminals or
work stations.
Via the UIS, the user is probably
connected to the services and resources
provided by one of two stable frameworks:
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either the technical toolset or the
management toolset for the particular
phase of interest. If, for example, the
methodology chosen for the systems
requirements analysis phase (P 1) is
COntrolled Requirements Expression (COR£),
then the technical tools in the stable
framework for that phase are intended to
reinforce the correct us• of the
methodology and to promote productivity of
the requirements engineers. Similarly,
the stable framework composed of the
management tools for that phase are both
complementary to the r•quireaents for
properly applying the methodology and for
the needs of the project man•germ. If the
methodology chosen to transform the
systems level requirements into software
requirements is Structured Analysis and
Design Techniques (SADT), then the
technical tool set that composes the
stable framework for reinforcing the
chosen methodology is shown under the
corresponding pha•e in the conceptual
model. Two points are worth noting.
First, phase identification attributes
will be • property of •11 objects,
relationships and attributes created by
the tools of a given phase. Thus, one can
look at the flgure and imagine a •table
framework in the lowest layer of the first
phase that represents the current baseline
of system requirements for a free flying
platform. These requirements had to be
captured by authorized users applying the
technical tools of the P 1 phase,
Although the tools of the second phase may
have read-only access to the stable
framework so that the transformation from
system to software requirements may take
place, the stable framework which will
compose the software requirements under
baseline control in the bottom row Of the
second column of the figure could only
have been developed by the technical tools
for the software requirements analysis
phase. Furthermore, the use of these
identification attributes to impose strong
typing and access control insures that
only the authorized teams from the
appropriate contractors using the
appropriate phase specific tools can
modify the content• of the stable
frameworks. The second ms}or point
considers • possible decision to change
the methodology employed in the P 2 phase.
Since P 2 exists between the stable
interface• of the systems requirements
analysis documentation (stored in the life
cycle project object bale) and the
software requirements analylil
documentation (also in the project object
base), then the change procedure will be
to acquire/develop new technica_ tools and
management tools for that phase and to
install them •8 the stable framework
replacement for the older tools. Note
that this Is possible because the
technical tools and management tools for
each phase are horizontally bounded as
stable frameworks between the UIS and the
SIS and they are vertically bounded by the
stable interface sets which represent the
documentation requirements for transitions
between phases. (Actually, the phase and
layer ide_tiflcation attributes accomplish
this vertical bounding.)
Be next stable interface set is the
"System Interface Set" (SIS) Of the CAIS.
The CAIS UIS and SiS provide a framework
for importing and/or developing new tool
set capabilities. _ne reader should note
that if any of the chosen tools were
developed in a language other than Ads,
the recommendation of the author is to
encapsulate the tool inside the
implementation part of •n Ada object. In
this manner, users who access the tools
via the UIS can only see the services and
relourcel of the abstract specification of
the object containing the tool. Therefore,
no llfe CyCle dependencies upon any of the
code segmsnte or data structure• of the
foreign language can inhibit the
subsequent evolvement of the environment.
The reader should also note that the SIS
Of the CAIS is specified in far more
detail than the UIS. The reason is to
facilitate the development of truly
transportable tools among Ma Programming
Support Environments (APSE).
The next two layers conelst of the Stable
Interface Sets for quality management and
integration and configuration management
respectively. The _ustification of
ordering flows naturally from the
activities previously described in the
conceptual model above. That is, when an
iteration through a phase has produced
sufficient documentation for • given
segment of the document, a trigger freezes
the &tt¢lbutee Of the segment from further
change so that the quality management team
may examine it. Thi• in turn is followed
by report• to management and appropriate
control boards which then results in a
configuration management decision.
The next layer is bounded by the stable
interface set specifying the services and
resources to be provided and consumed by
information, library, and object
management. The services and resources
available at this virtual interface set
hide lmDlementation details from the user,
tools and layers above. There are three
macroscopic layers shown beneath the
information, library and object management
services layer, although each of these
layers may in turn be subdivided depending
upon the size and complexity of the
project. The first layer is used to
facilitate tool-to-tool communication.
all tools should communicate through the
project object bile. When tools
co¢uuunicate directly to one another,
O_IGi_0_/,L PAGE IS
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valuable audit trail information is lost
and properties o[ recovery, security,
zntegrity, and reliability are severely
compromised. The leader should note that
as tools and the tool set for a particular
phase produce objects, relationships and
attributes, the tool-to-tool communication
that takes place in this layer had to pass
through each Of the preceding layers so
that an appropriate history and management
control is exerted upon the products at
all time. When objects, their
relationships, and associated attributes
are proposed for consideration in the next
baseline, they are advanced into the
temporal level of the life cycle project
object base. Again, attributes for the
stable frameworks always identify the life
cycle phase fie, column), the layer fie,
row), and the unique identification of the
stable framework of related objects that
are being considered. When the proposed
changes are approved to roll the current
baseline forward, and the integration and
acceptance testing of the new baseline has
been completed, a change of attributes
installs the stable framework in the
"persistent" object base layer
representing stable frameworks under
baseline control.
Summarv
for large, com01ex, non-stop, distributed
systems such as the Space Station Program
which evolve incrementally while they are
being continuously sustained and which
must simultaneously satisfy a large
collection of critical requirements, there
are four tyrannies that must be avoided in
the systems and software support
environment• Specifically, these include
life cycle dependencies upon any
proprietary or particular= operating
Lil. Ce,_
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system, data base management system, data
communications system, and instruction set
architecture. Otherwise, the author
believes strongly that a combination of
all three requirements for: complexity
management, safety management, and cost
effectiveness will be unacceptably
compromised. To avoid these dependencies,
this paper amplifies a proposal to use a
graduated series of concepts and
principles to evolve a conceptual and an
implementation model sufficient for the
life cycle of such projects. These are:
objects, stable interface sets, layers,
stable frameworks and conceptual models.
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